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INVISIBLE MARKETS NETTING VISIBLE RESULTS: WHEN
SUB-PRIME LENDING BECOMES PREDATORY
CASSANDRA JONES HAVARD·

In this article, I argue that Ellison's metaphor of social
invisibility-the societal undervaluing ofminorities-is analogous
to economic invisibility-the denial of fair access to credit to
minorities. I then use the metaphor of invisibility as a basis for
understanding the contemporary legal problem of predatory
lending, or making credit available to borrowers at unreasonably
high interest rates. Disguised as credit access to high-risk,
underserved borrowers, predatory lending helps to create risk by
offering borrowers products that do not adequately measure risk
and that are not fairly priced.
INTRODUCTION

I am an invisible man. ... I am a man of substance, offlesh
and bone, fiber and liquids-and I might even be said to possess a
mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to
see me.
. . . [For those who do see me it is] afigure in a nightmare
which the sleeper tries with all his strength to destroy. I
Is Ralph Ellison's literary work Invisible Man relevant to the law?
Certainly that is the underlying premise of a symposium of scholars
addressing Ellison and the law. Ellison's literary perspective strikingly
underscores core democratic principles of fairness and equality as he

• J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law; B.A., with highest honors, Bennett
College. Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I am
indebted to the Oklahoma City University Law Review staff for their research assistance.
I. RALPH ELLISON, INVIsmLE MAN 3-4 (2d Vintage Int'l ed. 1995) [hereinafter
INVISmLE MAN).
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examines the apparent bases for racial inequality and challenges that status
quo. 2
While Ellison would classify himself as an artist and not as a protest
writer, he addresses in relevant ways issues of legal and racial
subordination. 3 His writing explores the deep entrenchment of American
racial prejudice and arguably the laws that ensconce it. 4 His sense that all
art aspires to cultural and social integration effectively confronts the
complexity of American racial dynamics. By holding up for examination
what it means to be human, Ellison classifies racial bias as an exemplar of
human inequity.s In this same regard, his literary bent is to question
limitations of race on the personal condition and to argue for a more
universal acceptance of justice and equality.6
Ellison's character's indeterminate reaction--choosing to become

2. Written prior to the Civil Rights movement of the I 960s, Ellison's writing is
described in literary criticism as classified as part of the "Beat era," a cultural movement that
began in the late 1940s and continued into the I 960s. Many artists described as Beats
characterized themselves as countercultural radicals.
3. Ellison feared that his literary contributions would be marginalized ifhe addressed
issues of race. See Gerald Early, Decoding Ralph Ellison, 44 DISSENT, at para. 6 (1997),
available at http://www.igc.org/dissentlarchive/summer97fearly.html.
4. Recent critiques of Ellison's writing classify it as nontraditional in the genre ofjazz
music since Ellison's style was to fuse together uncommon literary themes and interpret
them as art. See generally Jabari Asim, State of the Art, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,2001, § X,
at T3 (describing literary critic Irving Howe's reaction to Ellison's work and Ellison's
response that among the objectives of the black author is to "to transcend his condition
through art"). See generally John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp. and Fire
Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv.
2129 (1992).
5. Ellison's approach is similar to that of contemporary critical race theorists. For
example, Professor Neil Gotanda has argued that the Supreme Court's "colorblind" standard
promotes white supremacy rather than racial equality. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.REv. I (1991). See also CharlesR. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego. and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317, 323 (1987) (arguing that a requirement of racist intent to prove a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause ignores the unconscious and cultural influence of racism on creating
law and public policy).
6. In later works, however, Ellison confronted head on the issue oflegal subordination
of black Americans. See generally RALPH ELLISON, Perspective ofLiterature, in GoINGTO
TIlE TERRIToRY 321-38 (1986) Guxtaposing Thomas Jefferson's and other founders'
ownership of slaves while drafting the Declaration of Independence and concluding that
ultimately the American Constitution was flawed given the founders' own conflicts
regarding human equality).
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invisib~by analogy focuses on the contradiction in terms that legal rules
provide in addressing issues of subordination and domination. A concrete
characterization of invisibility is the perception that the law is neutral and
determinate. It is this underlying current in Ellison's thinking that leads me
to argue that his concept of invisibility has a broader application. To
become or to treat one as invisible allows individuals to avoid reconciling
the impalpability of political and social issues with their concrete effects.
To uncover and understand the actual, invidious experiences of the human
condition compels a confrontation and an upsetting of the status quo. The
novel presents a contradiction in terms. Invisible Man becomes a failed
challenger of racial inequality. He hesitates to reconfigure his actions once
he determines that they are ineffective. This young man's optimism
becomes dashed and a social and political paralysis takes hold when he
comes to a truer understanding of the nature of adverse political conditions.
Ellison, by leaving his character in this powerless state at the novel's
conclusion, impliedly questions American law's ability to address issues of
racial inequality. 7
The visible effectS of supposed neutrality can produce indeterminate
results. One such exemplar is the economic subordination that sub-prime8
mortgage lending can create. Market incentives encourage lenders to use
unfair and deceptive practices and racial discrimination when making loans
to sub-prime borrowers, or those who do not qualify for credit at lower
rates. When making home-equity loans based on the value ofthe underlying
asset or collateral, some lenders have structured transactions that are
deleterious to borrowers. By basing the value of the loan on the collateral
and not the borrower's ability to repay, lenders have encouraged borrowers
to enter into transactions that are beyond their financial means to repay. By

7. Saul Bellow, "Man Underground": Review of Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man,
COMMENTARY 608-10 (June 1952), available at http://www.english.upenn.edul-afilreis/
50slellison-main.html.
8. Sub-prime lending is making credit available to borrowers with damaged credit
histories. Some non-prime lending is predatory, as characterized by both the costs and the
terms of the loans. Borrowers who are either financially unsophisticated or financially
desperate for credit may agree to unjustified high interest rates, payments that they cannot
afford, frequent refinancing arrangements, high and unfair prepayment penalties, excessively
high points or origination fees, and high broker fees. Predatory lending also involves
abusive lending practices in which the terms of the loan are inadequately correlated to the
riskiness ofthe loan. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road toSubprime "HEL" Was Paved
with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473 (2000).
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entering into structured transactions with unconventional and expensive
tenns, borrowers unwittingly agree to negative consequences. Furthennore,
when the loan is asset-based but lenders do not concomitantly lower the
borrower's interest rate, lenders fail to sufficiently value the underlying
collateral. The effect occurs in communities where foreclosure then
becomes the nonn. 9
When lenders inappropriately measure riskiness, sub-prime lending
becomes predatory. Thus, I argue that as played out in the context of assetbased lending, the invisibility of the market validates undervaluing the
collateral securing the loan. By ignoring the lack of speculativeness in
asset-based loans, lenders fail to reconcile the invisible causes-racial or
economic discrimination-with visible effects-losing homes to
foreclosure due to inappropriately priced loans. Consequently, sub-prime
lenders are not called upon to balance legally pennitted practices with what
is fair.
The discussion that follows focuses on the market forces that create
predatory lending, the lender rationales about. riskiness that justify
predatory lending, and the resultant market failures that I argue demonstrate
that the market is not self-correcting. The effect is a disregard of the
economic consequences and legal rights wrought by the market's invisible
hand.
1. THE INVISIBLE MAN: STORY OF ECONOMIC
SUBORDINATION AND SURVIVAL

"[A]fter I'm gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I never told
you, but our life is a war and I have been a traitor all my born days,
a spy in the enemy's country ever since I give up my gun back in
the Reconstruction. Live with your head in the lion's mouth. I want
you to overcome' em with yeses, undennine 'em with grins, agree
'em to death and destruction, let' em swoller you till they vomit or
bust wide open." ... "Learn it to the younguns .... "10

9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STAlES,
MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY AND FORECLOSURERAlES: 1980TO 1998, at 526 tbl. 823 (1999),
available at http://www.census.gov/statab/www.
10. INVISmLE MAN, supra note I, at 16. The naivete ofInvisible Man becomes clear
during the "Battle Royal" scene. Invisible Man is blind to reality, and throughout the novel
he struggles to remove the blindfold.
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The Invisible Man is a nameless narrator who recounts the journey of
self-discovery that leads him to a stance of unquieting self-responsibility.
As a high school and then a college student, Invisible Man moves from
naive blindness to a perceptiveness about the hatred that he experiences as
a black person in America. The story chronicles a journey in which
Invisible Man's physical eyes become "inner eyes." It ends as he calls
himself to task by trying to reconcile his involvement in political activities
which he mistakenly viewed as personally and socially liberating.
Three events symbolize Invisible Mans's social and economic
progression: a college scholarship, the eviction of an elderly couple from
their home, and losing his job with the Brotherhood. These demonstrate the
humiliation of economic dependence and set the stage for the narrator's
arguable social survival and freedom through invisibility. Three
conditions-market forces, market rationales, and market failures-are
foundational for predatory lending to exist.
Credit traditionally provides a measure of economic independence
because it gives the borrower immediate access to capital that she can repay
over time. As an American ideal, home ownership is one pinnacle of
economic status. As the home appreciates in value over time, homeowners
use the accumulated equity to obtain credit. When an equity loan is made,
the accumulated value of the home serves as both a limit on the amount of
the loan and as collateral in case of default. Yet, when the home-equity loan
is inappropriately priced, economic independence is foiled. If foreclosure
occurs, the homeowner's economic status changes and is not so readily
perceptible.
II. ECONOMIC INVISffiILITY:
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PREDATORY LENDING

A. Market and Social Forces
1 carried a heavy stone, the weight of a mountain on my
shoulders. 11
Invisible Man's ultimate social alienation and isolation arise because
he fails to know and understand the social codes for the environments in
which he finds himself. He is surrounded by contradictions regarding his

II. Id. at 443.
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expected behavior and by deceptions by those who are allegedly his
supporters.
Similarly, homeowners who apply for and are granted home-equity
loans are faced with numerous economic contradictions. The deregulation
of interest rates heralded the beginning of the fmancial modernization. 12 As
a result, many fmancial innovations, including the sub-prime loan, were
sanctioned. While the easing on interest-rate restrictions seemed cause for
alarm, market proponents argued that marketplace competition provides the
needed balance to enlarge the sub-prime markets.13 Deregulation has
encouraged economic invisibility-a conspicuous and conscious disregard
for the effects of lending. While it has always been common practice to
secure a mortgage loan with a home, it has become more common in recent
years to refinance mortgage loans, using the home as collateral and using
the equity proceeds for diverse purposes unrelated to the home. 14 When
loans are inappropriately priced, the risk offoreclosure becomes greater. If
foreclosure actually occurs, the homeowner-by losing the ownership
interest-becomes economically invisible. The rationales supporting the
market forces that created predatory lending are (1) that the borrower has
adequate information about the credit market and (2) that she understands
the terms of the loan.
1. Perfect Borrower Information
The journey of self-discovery that Invisible Man begins by entering
college is somewhat similar to the one that redlined homeowners feel when
finally offered an opportunity to receive credit based on the accumulated
equity in their homes. Traditionally denied credit access because of the
location of the property or their race, these homeowners feel empowered
when presented with the economic opportunity that credit provides. They
are often unaware that they are about to enter an arena that could lead to
economic woe if there are loan terms that are predatory.

12. See generally Thomas A. Durkin, An &onomic Perspective on Interest Rate
Limitations, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 821,833 (1993).
13. Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation
ofthe Federal Government's Promotion ofHome Equity Financing, 69 TVL. L. REv. 373,
419-23 (1994).
14. Loans secured by the equity in property, also known as "equity-skimming" loans,
present threats to home ownership.
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Likewise, Invisible Man, when the story begins, is unaware of what his
future portends. The bright hopes that a college education will bring are
prematurely ended. Invisible Man's tale of economic contradictions begins
with the receipt of a scholarship to attend college, awarded by the town's
white elite. Asked to recite a masterfully presented high school graduation
speech to earn the scholarship, the young student is allowed to do so only
after the elite become too drunk to listen, and he and the other black boys
in attendance are made to fight each other for gold coins.
Not knowing or understanding the social code of "a proper Negro" is
disastrous for Invisible Man. He is expelled from college because he took
a visiting white college trustee to visit the ''wrong side of town." The anger
and displeasure of the college president are revealed when the president
verbally chastises the young student and directs him to leave the school and
the South. Invisible Man, expelled from school, is sent to the North, told to
work to earn money and return to school with names and letters of
references from prospective employers.
Borrowing money has its unwritten economic code and is laden with
assumptions. Many would justify the rise of the sub-prime industry as an
appropriate development of a free economic market. In its simplest form,
that theory presupposes that the market fairly allocates credit to those who
are deserving of having it. This theory assumes that the borrower who
receives a sub-prime mortgage is well informed and is willing to pay a
higher interest rate. The underlying reason is that the borrower understands
that her creditworthiness requires a costlier loan or no credit at all.
The economic assumption of perfect borrower information assumes that
the borrower is fully informed and correctly perceives risk. Lenders justify
their lending decisions as rational judgments that borrowers accept. Lenders
posit that based on a system of perfect information loans adequately reflect
risk. The presumption is that the borrower is satisfied with the transaction.
The borrower's unwillingness to reject the loan demonstrates that the
borrower is satisfied with the loan's costs and its terms.
These presumptions are undergirded by basic principles of contract
law-that is, that borrowers have not just the same knowledge as lenders
but also have equal bargaining power. IS The loan transaction is a contract
requiring certain legal formalities to be enforceable. The final agreement

15. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U. S. 10 11 ( 1986) (upholding FTC credit pmctice rule because of consumers' limited ability
to shop for and bargain over terms).
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represents all of the terms that the parties wanted included in the contract.
Furthermore, the signed agreement represents both parties'
acknowledgment that the terms are mutually satisfactory. The law will
accord no relief when bargains have been freely entered into, because the
parties have the responsibility to read and understand the terms.
While these foundational premises of contract law are well founded,
their applicability in situations in which lenders target vulnerable borrowers
seems open to question. Predatory lenders specifically target as potential
borrowers the elderly, the illiterate, those for whom English is a second
language, and the uneducated. 16 The mandatory disclosures designed to
protect consumers are ofttimes ineffective. The inherently complex nature
of credit, when coupled with situations of lender discrimination in pricing,
indicates that this area is one in which market corrections are ineffective.
Not only does the borrower who enters into a predatory loan usually not
have adequate information regarding credit availability and other
alternatives, that borrower often does not understand the transaction itself.
2. Understanding Loan Pricing
Moving to a "new" world and receiving credit as a sub-prime borrower
can both prove to be dichotomous. The deeper issues that run below the
surface are masked. Specifically, the perceived economic status and
financial independence for Invisible Man and the sub-prime borrower may
not exist.
Harlem appears to be a place of economic freedom. Unlike the legally
segregated South, blacks can live and work where they choose. This
economic freedom, evolved from a legal system of segregation, seems
promising. Yet, Invisible Man's economic freedoms are directly undercut
when he uses the president's letters of reference. He learns that he has been
betrayed when the very words he hoped would further his employment
opportunities only bar him. The letters contain negative comments that bar
employment opportunities from the very prospective employers that
Invisible Man was told to visit. 17

16. See Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman. Mortgaged Lives: A Special Report,
Profiting from Fine Print with Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2000, at § Al
(discussing the enforcement action taken against a California lender that imposed more
onerous loan terms on borrowers from minority neighborhoods).
17. The letter reads, "To Whom It May Concern, ... Keep This Nigger-Boy Running."
INVISmLE MAN, supra note 1, at 33.
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In many respects, the college president, while deceiving Invisible Man,
served as a screener or risk calculator for Invisible Man's prospective
employers. He also devised a way to completely deter the young college
student. Having sent him away to earn funds, the president's scheme was
to keep Invisible Man from re-enrolling in college the following year. He
knew that the young college student would rely on his guidance and
recommendations and that they would not be helpful at all.
Predatory lending is not the same thing as sub-prime lending. Subprime lenders focus on individuals who do not qualify for loans from
traditional fmancial institutions. Fair lenders charge these "sub-prime"
individuals more, but they do not engage in a number of abusive practices
that define predatory lending. Generally, fair sub-prime lenders engage in
risk-based lending, making loans that are appropriately priced to
compensate for the risk of lending to a credit-blemished borrower.
Predatory lenders engage in asset-based lending. They charge fees and
interest rates far beyond the risk incurred, and price the loan based on the
assets of the borrower, which are usually tied to the borrower's equity in a
home.
Many borrowers do not recognize the distinctions between risk-based
lending and asset-based lending. They do not know that certain deceptive
and unfair practices regarding their refinanced mortgage or home-equity
loan are prohibited under federal law. These practices include steering or
deliberately putting borrowers with good credit into loans with high interest
rates, selling borrowers unnecessary insurance with high premiums and low
pay-outs, imposing prepayment penalties that lock borrowers into highinterest rate loans (making it difficult for borrowers to refinance or get out
of the loans), loan flipping or the repeated refmancing of the loan by rolling
the balance of an existing loan into a new loan, and imposing balloon
payments that typically set up the loan so that at the end of the loan period
the borrower still owes most of the principal amount borrowed.
Similarly, many who lend to sub-prime borrowers know that they are
promoting delinquent debt. While lenders may be facilitating growth in
formerly disinvested communities, borrowers need to become more
informed about the credit products that are offered. Many low- and
moderate-income borrowers do not know that lenders now find them
attractive prospects. In contrast to red lining, where borrowers were ignored,
now borrowers who own homes are aggressively solicited for credit. While
it has always been common practice to secure a mortgage loan with a home,
it has become more common in recent years to refinance mortgage loans
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using the home as collateral and using the equity proceeds for diverse
purposes unrelated to the home. Loans secured by the equity in property,
also known as "equity-skimming" loans, present threats to home ownership.
Borrowers need to become more aware that these loans threaten their
financial security, and are expensive, deceptive, and priced
disproportionately to the loan's value. 18
Although many low- and moderate-income neighborhoods have been
denied access to capital, homeowners have amassed some economic value
through the investment in their homes. Residential property as collateral
raises distinct issues. The property is both shelter (or home) and collateraL
As collateral, the predictability of property values in neighborhoods,
especially in declining areas, is difficult to assess. The lender who secures
a loan with a home focuses on the house as liquid security in case of
borrower default. While borrower and lender share a common goal, their
shared interest diverges as it relatesto the property's accumulated value. By
creating risk through high priced loans, the lender receives overpriced
payments; and should the borrower default, the lender forecloses on the
property, which can then be resold with some return of its accumulated
value. 19 The owner, on the other hand, loses property that she owned
outright previously.
Moreover, what is lost is neighborhood equity. Unmeasurable as an

18. Many predatory loans aretlipped excessively and are not made with regard to the
borrower's ability to repay. The issue of equity-skimming and its deleterious consequences
has been the subject of much congressional investigation and study. Problems in Community
Development Banking, Mortgage Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home
Equity Lending: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d
Congo (1993); The Home Ownership and equity Protection Act of 1993: S. 924 Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 103d Congo (1993); H.R. 3153,
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of1993: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Credit & Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 103d
Congo (1994); Community Development Institutions: Hearings Before the House Subcomm.
on Fin. Insts. Supervision, Regulation & Deposit Ins. of the Comm. on Banking, Fin., &
UrbanAffairs, 103d Congo (1993); Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their
Way to Profits: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Congo (1998);
MICHAEL HUDSON, PREDATORY FINANCIAL PRACTICES: How CAN CONSUMERS BE
PROTECfED? (1998).
19. Information costs are the costs of acquiring additional information to determine
whether a prospective borrower is creditworthy. See generally William C. Gruben et aI.,
Imperfect Information and the Community Reinvestment Act, FED. REs. BANK SAN
FRANCISCO ECON. REv., Summer 1990, at 27,29 (discussing the cost of risk assessment
methods).
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asset, it is the community investment that occurs in neighborhoods that have
a high incidence of individual home ownership. Communities are stabilized
where individuals feel invested through property ownership. Community
development and improvements that have taken years are squandered as the
stability of neighborhoods gives way to the decline that attends
foreclosure. 2o Additionally, lower property values and social conditions
such as increased crime and drug problems may arise. There may also be
the cyclical effect. As the costs of neighborhood decline become more
difficult to assess, lenders ration credit or make less credit available,
thereby forcing even more high-risk borrowers to go into sub-prime
markets. 21 In fact, what seems to be readily established is that the more
vulnerable the borrower, the more likely lenders are to assert that there is
a legitimate business justification.
B. Lenders' Rationales for Predatory
Lending: High Rate and High Risk
You're black and living in the South-did you forget how to
lie?22
I had to be strong and purposeful to get where I am. I had to
wait and plan . ... 23
Invisible Man's "new" world masks many issues regarding the African

20. One report correlates sub-prime financing with foreclosure rates in AfricanAmerican neighborhoods. See Harold L. Bruce et aI., Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking
Gun of Predatory Lending?, in HOUSING POLICY IN TIlE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 259 (Susan M. Wachter & R. Leo Penne eds., 200 I ) (articles presented at the
2000 conference convened by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's
Offices of Policy Development and Research and Housting), available at
http://www.huduser.org!publicationslpolleg!hpcproceedings.html.
21. Given the phenomenon of moral hazard, the lender makes less credit available
because of an inability to distinguish between those who are creditworthy and those who are
risk-adverse. See generally James R. Barth et aI., Moral Hazard and the Thrift Crisis: An
Empirical Analysis, 44 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REp., Winter 1990, at 22 (describing moral
hazard as those circumstances in which the risks to the insured bank are so low that the
financial institution has a greater incentive to allow the institution to become insolvent rather .
than maintain a positive capital status).
22. INVIsmLE MAN, supra note I, at 139. This and the following quoted passage are
both spoken by Bledsoe and illustrate his views on how a black person should act in order
to gain power.
23. Id at 143.
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American's economic status and independence. Uncertain about his future,
the narrator makes contacts that lead to his employment in a paint factory.
The factory's production of white paint is a metaphor for whitewashing the
African-American experience into the American Dream. 24 The acceptance
of a blue-collar job represents a change in the narrator's economic fortunes.
It is significant for two reasons. First, implicitly the narrator abandons his
dream of quickly resuming his formal education. Second, the narrator
becomes responsible for his own economic survival.
A strict economic analysis requires the borrower to be responsible for
her own economic survival. This line of reasoning attributes the lender's
decision-making to private market mechanisms, with the market correcting
the information deficiencies. When the market fails to respond to inaccurate
information, however, sub-prime lending becomes predatory. The
mechanisms that should actually reduce the costs fail to control them even
though the economic variables indicate that there are lower risks.
Lenders argue that there is a basis for pricing the sub-prime equity loan.
The explanation is that the borrower's previous credit history and threat of
default on the obligation justify the high interest rate. Profit maximization
requires the lender to shift the risk of loss to the borrower. An underlying
predicate of predatory lending is that the lender's judgment and
underwriting policies are adequately based. Lenders' judgments are favored
when it is assumed that the costs of lending are fairly calculated. Inherent
in this notion is the presumption that the lender treats all borrowers fairly,
if not necessarily equally.
In the home-equity loan context, the economic assumption of a fair
lender with rational underwriting standards presumably incorporates the
collateral that secures the loan. It should follow that the availability of credit
and rates offered are indicative of the borrower's actual creditworthiness.
The lender's stereotyping of the borrower should not contribute to the
borrower's risk nor the interest rate charged. Recent evidence belies the
presumptions that favor the lender. Lenders price loans in tiers--correlating
the rate to the risk classification. Within this purported tier-pricing, there is
reported evidence of discriminatory pricing. 25 Many recent studies on

24. Richard Corliss, Obituary, Invincible Man Ralph Ellison, 1914-1994, TIME, Apr. 25,
1994, at 90.
25. See Justice Settles First Suit on Overages: Laso Settles with Banks On Illegal Rates,
65 BNA BANKING REP. 667 (Oct. 23, 1995) (settlement of lawsuit alleging higher interest
rates were charged to African Americans).
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mortgage lending that have made comparisons across racial lines find that,
by far, minorities have not fared as well in the loan application and
approval process of mortgage lending. If this is so, the lender's perceived
judgments about the borrower's risk do not factor into the interest rate
offered.
Most borrowers who lose or are under the threat of losing their home
already own their home before taking out the sub-prime loan. The
tremendously inflated costs of the sub-prime loan create most of the risk of
default and foreclosure. 26 However, when the loan is secured by property,
there appears to be little justification for the higher interest rate. Moreover,
the market has not acted as a control for the charging of virtually unlimited
interest rates on non-purchase-money loans secured by a borrower's
residence. Even when these rates seem to be clearly usurious, there is no
market control that makes the rates for these loans less high as interest rates
fall.
The reality of Harlem as an impoverished economic community for
blacks comes into focus when the narrator witnesses the eviction of a
elderly couple for failure to pay rent. 27 As white men scatter all of the
couple's belongings randomly onto the street, they explain that the action
is legal and beyond their control. Invisible Man intervenes, speaking
eloquently, and convincing the crowd to avoid an angry confrontation. He
is also successful in convincing the owner to allow the couple to reenter the
premises for a fmal time. 28 It is at this incident that the narrator is recruited
to work for the Brotherhood, an integrated organization that supposedly
addresses issues of social equality.
The scene represents the dispossession of a people and foreshadows the
dispossession and conflict the narrator will feel as he becomes a part of an
organization that he has not fully investigated and does not fully
understand. Vastly different from the formal education he had hoped for,
this particular "street" event will shape the informal education that he
receives in Harlem.

26. See Mansfield, supra note 8, at 554 (comparing the disparate delinquency and
foreclosure rates between conventional lenders and sub-prime lenders).
27. Invisible Man's "Northern" experience runs the gamut from being used as a guinea
pig by medical researchers to his recruitment by communists who are allegedly fighting
racial inequality.
28. INVIsmLE MAN, supra note 1, at 281.
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Lenders rely on economic and social codes that borrowers do not
understand or even realize fully. The culture of lending rests on the
economic assumption that the risk of the loan justifies the cost. While subprime loans carry a high risk of default, it is unclear whether these risks are
caused by the credit condition of the borrower before the loan is made or
by the loans themselves. Lenders argue that sub-prime borrowers are a
risky bunch, and that this causes high delinquency and default rates and
also dictates the high cost of sub-prime loans.
The predatory loan industry typically justifies the high interest rates
generated by its loans in several ways. Primarily, the industry maintains that
because its borrowers are typically high-credit risks, interest rates must
reflect that risk. 29 This argument assumes that high-risk borrowers will not
payoff the loan. The industry contends that if the rates are lowered, it will
be forced out of business due to the costs of unrecovered debt. 30 Yet lenders
themselves admit that their customers do in fact payoff their loans.
The argument that lower rates will result in a detrimental loss of profits
is exceedingly tenuous when the practices and statistics of lenders who
choose to make sub-prime loans but do not use foreclosure practices are
examined. These lenders are able to show profitability and an ability to
recoup losses in case of default. 31
Creditors arguably adjust interest rates according to the risk that they
assume by making loans. Yet when the loan is collateralized by an asset that
is valued at more than the loan, the lender has elevated the borrower's risk
that missed payments may lead to foreclosure. The flawed assumptions of
the free-market approach justify regulatory intervention.

29. See Statement of Elena Delgado, President, Irwin Home Equity Corporation, at
Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 1720 (Sept. 7, 2000), transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/eventslPublic
Hearingsl2000907/20000907 am.htm.
30. See Mansfield, supra note 8, at 539-40.
31. See Statement of Robert Gnaizda, Policy Director & General Counsel, The
Greenlining Institute, at Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending at the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco 20-23 (Sept. 7, 2000), transcript available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/eventslPublicHearingsl2000907120000907am.htm (testimony oflrwin Mortgage
Company).
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III. ECONOMIC VISIBILITY: ADJUSTING FOR MARKET FAILURE

I'd been sofascinated by the motion that I'dforgotten to measure
what it was bringingforth. 32
Told that he was a good "spokesman for [his] people,"33 Invisible Man
reluctantly joins the Brotherhood. Working for the Brotherhood provides
Invisible Man with an informal education. Initially charmed by its lofty
principles, he later realizes that working for the organization requires a
surrender of his political and economic independence and underscores his
own naivete and blinded perceptions. His initial caution is confirmed when
he deviates from a written speech at a rally. After addressing the crowd
with.an impromptu and emotional speech that departed dramatically from
the scripted version that had been prepared for him, he is told explicitly by
one of the organization's leaders that he was not hired to think.34 Although
the narrator does not immediately recognize his own blindness to the
organization's aims and objectives, the organization's plan to silence him
points out his subordination. The narrator's own personality and thoughts
must be subsumed within the organization's game plan.
Predatory lending has its own designs as well. Yet, its proponents argue
that excessive regulation will eliminate competition from the market. 3s

A. Statutory and Regulatory Restrictions
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA)36
imposes disclosure requirements and other limits on certain high-cost,
home-secured loans. A loan is covered by HOEPA if (1) the Annual
Percentage Rate (APR) exceeds the rate for treasury securities with a
comparable maturity by more than ten percentage points, or (2) the points

32. INVIsmLE MAN, supra note I, at 444.
33. Id. at 293.
34. Id. at 348-49.
35. See generally Statement of Elena Delgado, supra note 29; Statement by Robert
Gnaizda, supra note 31.
36. See generally Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1640-41 (2000) (HOEPA).
()
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and fees paid by the consumer exceed the greater of eight percent of the
loan amount or $400. 37
HOEPA does not prohibit creditors from making any home-secured
loan, nor does it limit or cap rates that creditors may charge. Instead,
HOEPA layers disclosure and timing requirements onto the requirements
already imposed for consumer credit transactions. Creditors offering
HOEPA-covered loans must provide abbreviated disclosures to consumers
three days before the loan is closed. The disclosures provide that consumers
are not obligated to complete the closing. They also remind borrowers that
they could lose their home if they fail to make payments, and state a few
key cost disclosures, including the APR, the regular payment, and, if the
loan has a variable rate, a "worst case payment" if rates increase at the
maximum rate and under the quickest period under the loan agreement.
In addition, creditors making HOEPA-covered loans are prohibited
from including in their loan agreements, among other provisions,
(1) balloon payments in loans with maturities of less than five years,
(2) payment schedules that result in negative amortization, (3) higher
default interest rates, and (4) prepayment penalties in most instances.
Consumers entering into a HOEPA-covered loan may rescind the
transaction for up to three years after closing if creditors fail to provide the

37. This rate is adjusted annually based on the Consumer Price Index. HOEPA is
implemented by Section 32 of the Board's Regulation Z. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2001).
HOEPA is part of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1601-67f (2000)
(requiring disclosures and establishing certain substantive requirements in connection with
consumer credit transactions). HOEPA creates special protections for consumers in certain
non-purchase, high-cost loans secured by their homes.
Several other federal laws protect consumers. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.c. § 41-77 (2000); § 45(a) (broadly prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-91f
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination against applicants for credit on the basis of age, race, sex,
marital status, or other characteristics).
Home-purchase loans are not covered by HOEPA. Although reverse mortgages are
exempt from the HOEPA requirements imposed for traditional mortgages, reverse mortgages
are subject to an alternative detailed disclosure scheme under HOEPA. Home-equity lines
of credit (open-end credit) are also exempt from HOEPA, as congressional hearings
preceding enactment did not reveal evidence of abusive practices connected with open-end
home-equity lending.
The Federal Reserve Board is authorized to make some adjustments to HOEPA's
high-cost triggers that could affect the scope of the Act's coverage. The Board is also
directed by HOEPA to prohibit certain acts and practices in connection with mortgage loans
if the Board makes the findlTIgs required by the statute, as it has done recently.
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early disclosures or if they include a prohibited term in the loan agreement.
Sub-prime lenders argue that imposing additional disclosure
requirements and substantive provisions on sub-prime lending will only
drive up the cost of credit or eliminate it altogether. 38 Those who argue for
no change in HOEPA or the existing regulatory structure contend that
borrowers would have to rely more heavily on the fringe banking industry
for credit. 39 This is a common argument used in protesting the changes in
consumer regulatory laws. 40
The concerns that credit restrictions will shut individuals out of the
credit market seem greatly exaggerated as long as such restrictions do not
make consumer lending unprofitable. An increasing number of alternative
sources of credit specifically seek to offer lower rates of interest to
high-risk borrowers. Credit unions have begun to focus on expanding their
memberships by extending credit to low-income borrowers. 41 Through
education and counseling, some credit unions manage credit extension to
high-risk borrowers. Although these alternative services require specialized
services to educate the borrower in management and maintenance of credit,
the long-term effect of their ability to prevent borrowers from perpetual
debt is positive.

38. See Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., The Non-Conforming Credit Lending
Committee Working Group Summary: Subprime Lending & High Cost Mortgages:
Recommended "Best Practices" & "Legislative Guidelines," at http://www.mbaa.org/
residentllib2000/0525a.html.
39. See Statement of Elena Delgado, supra note 29.
40. In response to predatory lending allegations, the Federal Reserve Board amended
Regulation Z of the TILA to broaden the scope of loans subject to the protections of
HOEPA by adjusting the price triggers that determine coverage under the Act.
The rate-based trigger is lowered by two percentage points for first-lien loans, and
the fee-based trigger is revised to include optional insurance premiums and similar credit
protection products paid at closing. Certain acts and practices in connection with homesecured loans are prohibited. There is also a rule to restrict creditors from engaging in
repeated refinancings of their own HOEPA loans over a short time period when the
transactions are not in the borrower's interest. See 12 CFR § 226.
41. See generally Anthony D. Taibi, Banking. Finance. and Community Economic
Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory. Procedural Civil Rights. and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1465, 1520-28 (1994) (arguing that bankers'
disinvestment in minority communities should lead those communities to begin formation
of their own credit sources).
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B. Market Segmentation
Lending has become transparent. The availability of credit is affected
by scoring and the secondary market. The securitization of the sub-prime
market has created more access to capital for predatory lenders. 42 The effect
is to create. a steady capital flow for predatory lenders.
Lenders traditionally complain about the difficulty of accessing the
creditworthiness of low-income markets. 43 Although lenders argue that
there is a rationale for the pricing of the sub-prime equity loan, the location
of the property or the race or sex of the borrower appear to continue to be
indications of a borrower's creditworthiness. Predatory lenders identify
neighborhoods that have been neglected by traditional markets. Individuals
selected to receive sub-prime loans using this method of marketing may
include not only those with poor credit histories, but also those who may be
qualified to borrow at primary market prices. 44 Although access to capital
satisfies a key component to revitalizing the inner cities, there is cause for
alarm when that access raises the risk of future losses in those same
communities.
At the novel's end, when the narrator recognizes that the Brotherhood
exists to cause a "race riot" and had used him to further that goal, he
becomes disillusioned. Once the riot erupts and the narrator is unable to
escape the fighting, he goes underground into a manhole. Finding that he
cannot break out, the Invisible Man takes up residence, literally rewiring
this hole in the ground.
While the narrator would claim that he is subordinated due to the
diminishing effects wrought by racism and prejudice, ironically the retreat
underground represents an emergence to self-identity. The narrator realizes
that his values are in direct conflict with all of those around him. His

42. DEP'TS OF TREASURY AND HOUSING & URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REpORT 45 (June 2000), available at http://www.huduser.
orglpublicationsipdf/treasrpt.pdf.
43. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory,
Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J. 237,244 (1996)
(discussing banks' complaints about the effectiveness of grassroots organizations in getting
CRA concessions at time of merger applications).
44. See generally CTR. FOR RESPONSmLE LENDING, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE CASE
AGAINST PREDATORY LENDING, at http://www.responsiblelending.orglCoalitionStudiesi
PL%20-%20Issue%20paper''1020Exec%20summary%20rev%204-5%20expand.htm.
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seclusion also represents a withdrawal from society while he ponders how
to modify his approach to confronting racism. His economic freedom is
symbolized by his invisible status, which allows him to live rent-free and
use hundreds of light bulbs at no cost.
Market segmentation is another term for lenders' ability to select
borrowers based on criteria other than credit factors. Lenders often identify
borrowers, especially affluent ones, to target offers of credit opportunities.
Lenders assess a borrower's ability and willingness to repay debt by
looking at the borrower's prior credit history. Predatory lenders look at
prior credit history as well. Unfortunately for some borrowers, predatory
lenders segment the market by offering certain products only to low- and
moderate-income homeowners.
Recognizing that predatory lenders have market power in certain
communities raises issues about the effectiveness of competition as well as
the lender's underwriting decisions. 45 When lenders identify distinct
geographic markets or offer customers distinct products, price differentials
for the same or similar products can occur. 46 More scrutiny must be placed
on how lenders measure risk and then use that assessment to segment the
market, It is unclear whether the current pricing mechanisms used in the
industry adequately account for the market segmentation that has developed
in the sub-prime credit industry.47
Credit access based on excessively high interest rates actually puts
marginally qualified borrowers at a greater risk of failure. When the legal
system fails to respond to this type of market segmentation, it is allowing
the market to legitimately treat marginally qualified borrowers in ways that
undercut a fair and efficient creditworthiness evaluation. Such behavior,
while ultimately evidence of a dysfunctional and irrational market, is also
devoid of legal protections.

45. See generally Timothy C. Lambert, Note, Fair Marketing: Challenging
Pre-application Lending Practices, 87 GEO. LJ. 2181, 2189-92 (1999) (discussing market
segmentation in the credit card industry).
.
46. Markets have two dimensions-product and geography. Product markets consist of
the products for sale and reasonable alternatives. Geographic markets delineate the
purchaser's and seller's competitive market. Mark Sievers & Brooks Albery, Strategic
Allocation o/Overhead: The Application o/Traditional Predation Tests to Multiproduct
Firms, 60 ANTITRUST LJ. 757, 768 n.24 (1992).
47. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Credit Democracy: What's Sub-Prime Lending Got To
Do With It?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY _ (Patricia
A. McCoy ed., forthcoming Mar. 2002).
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IV. CHALLENGING THE LENDER'S NORM
I'm an invisible man and it placed me in a hole-or showed me the
hole I was in .... 48

Fair and responsible sub-prime lending benefits a wide range of
borrowers who might otherwise not have access to credit. Thus, borrowers
whose damaged credit histories had rendered them invisible become visible
to lenders. While lenders facilitate growth in formerly dis invested
communities, borrowers need to become more informed about the credit
products that are offered. This need for self-responsibility does not diminish
the law's examination of needed reforms as well.
Three specific reforms, if instituted, can help correct the flawed
assumptions. They are measuring a borrower's ability to repay, limiting
loan fees, and limiting steering.
First, as I have discussed previously,49 lenders using residential
property lJ,s collateral should be required to measure the borrower's residual
income as a part of the loan qualification process. 50 A residual-income
requirement for asset-based lending requires underwriters to document that
the borrower will have an identifiable amount of income after making the
loan payment to cover other expenses, including unexpected ones. 51 If this
standard becomes the norm, lenders using risk-based pricing differentials
will have to reconcile their hoped-for returns with the amount of risk the
borrower assumes. Reports of poor documentation by lenders regarding
what factors were considered in determining ability to repay demonstrate

48. INVIsmLE MAN, supra note I, at 572.
49. See Havard, supra note 47.
50. Residual income, which is pegged to the cost ofliving in a relevant geographic area,
and the number of persons withi.n a household who must rely on the income, is a fixed dollar
amount. For example, the residual income requirement applies to all Veterans
Administration loans. See Mark D. Fleischer & Amy J. Mayer, Increasing Involvement of
Regulatory Agencies and Public OffiCials in Consumer Issues, 1242 PRAC. L. INST. 581,685
(2001).
51. Debt to income ratio (DTI) reflects the percentage of a borrower's income that is
devoted to paying for the loan each month. See generally Marjorie L. Girth, The Role of
Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 IND. L.J. 17
(1989) (discussing some of the variables that compose the debt income ratio based on filed
bankruptcy cases).
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rampant, unlawful asset-based lending. 52 Requiring lenders to consider the
ability to repay will correct the overall failure of lenders to ignore this
criterion.
Second, loan fees to mortgage brokers, including yield spread
premiums, should be sharply curtailed and in some cases prohibited. 53
Currently, yield spread premium practices compensate mortgage brokers
who are able to convince borrowers to accept a higher interest rate loan.
Mortgage brokers, who are independent loan officers that refer borrowers
to fmancial institutions for loans, are not subject to any federal oversight.
A yield spread premium (YSP) is a financing option that allows a
borrower to finance upfront settlement costs. YSPs are payments made by
a lender to a mortgage broker in return for a referral of an "above par" loan.
An above par loan is a loan with a higher interest rate. A par loan is a loan
with an interest rate that a borrower qualifies for without paying discount
points. A "below par" loan is a lower interest rate loan that a borrower pays
discount points to receive. 54
The average borrower who seeks the assistance of a mortgage broker
has the expectation that the broker will provide a loan at the lowest rate the
broker can find. The YSP is a specific broker fee that pays the broker for
her services in finding the loan. The average borrower is not aware that the
mortgage broker receives an additional fee from the lender. 55
The premium has been described as particularly suited to borrowers
who are low on cash and whose loan-to-value ratio has already reached the
maximum permitted by the lender. One research study has determined that
YSPs are being used principally to allow mortgage brokers to impose
higher prices on borrowers who bear the cost of these charges. 56 Some

52. See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Predatory Lending Practices in the HomeEquity Lending Market (Sept. 7, 2000), at http://www.fic.gov/osl2000/09predatorylending
.htm.
53. Yield Spread Premiums were the recent subject of a policy statement. See
Department of Housing and Urban Development Statement of Policy 2001-1,66 Fed. Reg.
53,052 (Oct. 18,2001).
54. See Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices:
Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2001) (testimony of Ira Rheingold), at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/02_0IhrglOI0802/rheingld.htm.
55. Id.
56. See Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices:
Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2001) (testimony of Prof. Howell E.
Jackson), at http://www.banking.senate.gov/02_0IhrglOI0802/jackson.htm.
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lenders and industry researchers have described the YSP as a financing tool
that encourages discrimination. 57 Arguably, yield spread premiums are
against the letter and spirit of federal laws designed to prohibit kickbacks
and referral fees in mortgage transactions. 58
Third, there is "end steering" to high-rate lenders of customers with
good to reasonable credit records. All lenders, whether federally regulated
or not, when making a loan secured by a mortgage, should verify that the
loan is priced solely according to the risk. This can be accomplished in part
by requiring the use of uniform underwriting standards for loaris that are
priced more than two points above the prime rate and when the collateral
is located in communities defined as economically distressed. 59 There is
tremendous diversity among sub-prime lenders because each lender
maintains its own underwriting standards. By developing its own funding
matrices, each lender sets certain criteria that define a borrower as subprime and further grades the borrower into a sub-prime category. These
funding matrices purportedly categorize borrowers based on their credit
histories, property values, loan-to-value ratios, and sometimes the
borrower's credit scores. The matrices then set a loan rate based on the
lender's categorization of the borrower. Under current regulations, when
these matrices are flawed, borrowers suffe.r. Instead, a focus on
equity-skimming loans would highlight loans which have the characteristics
of"reverse-redlining"-targeting protected classes, particularly the elderly
and minority homeowners, for more expensive credit unrelated to legitimate
indicia of creditworthiness.

57. See Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices:
Abusive Uses of Yield Spread Premiums (Jan. 8, 2001) (testimony of David Donaldson),
at http://www.banking.senate.gov/02_0Ihrgl0I0802/dnldson.htm; Press release, Housing
and Urban Development, New Reports Document Discrimination Against Minorities by
Mortgage Lending Institutions (Sept. 15, 1999), at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/
pressrellpr99-191.html.
58. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000) (RESPA).
59. Measuring loss of neighborhood goodwill ought to become important in lending
decisions. An evaluation of sub-prime lending decisions in terms of the disparate
consequences ofthose decisions on elderly, minority, and low-income borrowers provides
a different perspective. See generally Zina Gefter Greene, Reviewing Files for Mortgage
Lending Discrimination, in MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINAnON, AND FEDERAL
POLICY 573-87 ( John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996).

2001]

When Sub-Prime Lending Becomes Predatory

1079

CONCLUSION

I have been hurt to the point ofabysmal pain, hurt to the point
of invisibility. ...
. . . You won't believe in my invisibility and you '/l fail to see
how any principle that applies to you could apply to me. 60
Invisible Man's economic, mental, and social subordination to the
Brotherhood's hierarchical structure ends because of his voluntary
seclusion. Inevitably, he realizes that none of the situations and
circumstances that he encounters-beginning with the award of a college
scholarship-are what they appear to be. In each case, human frailty masks
economic power. His initial choice to withdraw at the novel's conclusion
allows him to hide from political and economic forces and avoid coming to
terms with his purposes and how to establish his identity. And yet, Invisible
Man recognizes that invisibility is not a means to an end and that ultimately
he must accept social responsibility and again work to cure society's illS.61
Ellison hoped that his work would fundamentally change the American
. political discourse, if not its community. 62 He used literature to reconstruct
social institutions to reveal racial hierarchies. Ellison takes exception to the
guises for racial equality that neutrality and objectivity pose. 63 His work
introduces the dissonance of race consciousness, thereby underscoring the
true indeterminacy of law when it fails to fully reconcile the rights of the

60. INVISIBLE MAN, supra note 1, at 579-80.
61. Id. at 580-81.
62. See Barbara Foley, Ralph Ellison as Proletarian Journalist, SCI. & SOC'Y (Winter
1998-99), available at http://www.victorian.fortunecity.com/holbeinl439Ibf/foleyreleft
2.html.
63. Cf Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 872 (1997) (addressing the
thesis that law suffers from indeterminacy of reasons, meaning the relationship between the
set of available legal reasons and the justification of legal outcomes).
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subordinate group with the obligations owed by the dominant one. 64
Invisible Man challenges all that renders one inferior and therefore of less
consequence to another.
Fairness and efficiency are diametrically opposed. While efficiency
concerns may affect credit access, those concerns need not dictate
economic results in an inequitable way. Credit access based on excessively
high interest rates actually puts marginally qualified borrowers at a greater
risk of failure. To guard against unfair, fraudulent practices in the subprime credit industry, existing informational deficiencies need to be
corrected in the current market structure.
Scrutinizing how lenders measure risk and then use that assessment to
segment the market must become a policy priority. Lenders should be able
to demonstrate that they have properly calculated the costs through
underwriting that justify higher rates. Borrowers, too, need to be wellinformed about the nature of the lending operation. Financial literacy
requires that borrowers fully understand the agreements they sign.
Ellison's novel dissented from the dominant mores of the day. He
deconstructed popular culture about the inferiority of African Americans
and launched a debate about racial affirmation and identity. He refused to
be bound to the characterization, tone, or accepted mores of what a "Negro"
story should or should not be, or more importantly, how or what an author
who happened to be black should write about.
Even still, Ellison challenges notions of racial inequity within and
outside of the African-American community. His writing suggests that race
is a social construct and thereby challenges the inherent biases that first
must be excised before they are addressed. The presumption is that socially

64. As one legal scholar characterized the effects of inferiority:
[T]he precept of inferiority did not define any specific right or obligation.
Instead, "inferiority" spoke to the state of the mind and the logic of the heart.
It posed as an article of faith that African Americans were not quite altogether
human. What's more, "inferiority" did not owe its existence to the legal process.
Although the law came to enforce the precept, it did not create it. From the time
the Africans first disembarked here in America, the colonists were prepared to
regard them as inferior. When the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and,
presumably, all its attendant conditions, it did not eliminate the precept of
inferiority. Even much later, when the law abolished state-enforced racial
segregation, it still did not eliminate the precept.
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS
OF TIIE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 9 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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constructed principles cannot be race-neutral given a history of legallymandated segregation.
Similarly, the economic forces that have combined to deny credit to
underserved markets now identify those same communities as creditworthy.
Nevertheless, denying prime credit to qualified borrowers and granting subprime credit to marginally qualified borrowers are on the same continuum:
Neither adequately measures risk.

